Foreword
Berle VII: The Modern Corporation and A Theory of
Fields
Charles R. T. O’Kelley∗
On May 26-27, 2015, scholars disparately trained in law, anthropology, economics, political science, history and sociology gathered in
Seattle for the seventh annual Berle Symposium. As with prior symposia,
a principal aim of Berle VII was to shed light on the nature of the modern corporation. As with prior symposia, the voices participating represented numerous disciplines. What sets Berle VII apart from its forerunners, however, was the decision to make social scientists the dominant
voices, and to select a theory propounded by sociologists—field theory—
as the focal point and backdrop for the symposium. This choice reflected
a second principal aim of Berle VII—to introduce field theory not only to
participants at the live event, but through the published version, to the
large community of legally trained scholars to whom the theory has not
yet spoken. Our goal with this is to assist these scholars as they continue
the never ending task of better understanding the nature of both the modern corporation and the society in which we live and work.
The decision to focus on field theory as a potential tool for legallytrained scholars would not have been plausible but for A Theory of
Fields, a remarkable book combining the insights of two sociologists:
Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam.1 Field theory is rooted primarily in
the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, but draws on and
shares insights from institutional theory, network analysis, and social
movement theory.2 This body of work is immense and, for
nonspecialists, often dense and nearly impenetrable. Moreover, the barri∗
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ers to common understanding between scholars in these related fields is
substantial.3 A Theory of Fields does the hard work of synthesizing this
prior work while adding to it McAdam and Fligstein’s unique contributions.4 The result is a powerful account of field theory which, without
sacrificing scientific rigor, is easily accessible not only to scholars in
these related fields but to determined readers in other disciplines or the
well-educated citizen.5
The standard law and economic account views the corporation as
simply a legal nexus for a complex array of ex ante contractual bargains
made by persons who assume various legally defined roles within a
firm—CEO, director, shareholder, employee. Whether viewing the corporation or the broader economy, this account takes the human actor as
the only real entity, and the only unit worthy of analysis.6 Further, each
human actor is assumed to be a wealth maximizer, who pursues her own
3. The authors observe:
[F]or most academics, the more meaningful competition occurs within rather than between disciplines. So sociologists compete with other sociologists, economists compete
with other economists, and so on. . . . This internal focus means that most academics attend closely to intellectual trends within their chosen discipline but are only dimly aware,
if not entirely ignorant, of new lines of work in other disciplines. Needless to say, this
disciplinary myopia represents another significant impediment to the accumulation of
knowledge in the social sciences.
. . . As the number of social scientists has exploded over the past fifty years and the number of discrete subfields within each discipline has mushroomed as well, the work done
by the modal scholar has grown ever narrower and more specialized. Scholars have an interest in trying to grow their career by shutting what they are doing off from what others
are doing in order to claim novelty.
Id. at 209.
4. Id. at 200–08.
5. In other words, like Adolf Berle with his seminal work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, McAdam and Fligstein are also doing the important work of public intellectuals, by
making their scholarly work accessible not only to influential actors in other academic disciplines,
but also accessible by nonacademic actors who operate in the world of government and politics.
6. The literature is voluminous. The most cited and root article is Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Bainbridge provides a notable summary:
Most law and economics scholars embrace a model of business organizations known as
the “nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm.” These so-called “contractarians” model the
firm not as a single entity, but as an aggregate of various inputs acting together with the
common goal of producing goods or services. Employees provide labor. Creditors provide debt capital. Shareholders provide equity capital, bear the risk of losses, and monitor
the performance of management. Management monitors the performance of employees
and coordinates the activities of all the firm’s inputs. The firm is simply a legal fiction
representing the complex set of contractual relationships between these inputs. In other
words, the firm is not an individual thing, but rather a nexus or web of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations among the various inputs making up
the firm.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 859 (1997) (footnote omitted).
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self-interest at all times, with such self-interest in almost all cases capable of measurement in pecuniary terms.7
McAdam and Fligstein paint a very different account in their version of field theory. To begin with, human actors should not be viewed
as near solely interested in economic gain. Equally important is the existential function of the social. Human actors’ lives are equally about
meaning making—the effort to live a life that justifies, combats, and
somehow holds at bay the existential dread that life on this earth will end
for all of us.8 This does not involve a rejection of material ends, but a
merging of those ends with equally important nonmaterial goals.
Even as strategic actors are working to advance their interests, they
are simultaneously exercising the distinctive human capacity for meaning
making and the construction of collective identities. People do what they
do both to achieve instrumental advantage and to fashion meaningful
worlds for themselves and others.9
Field theory thus accepts the importance of economic considerations as a motivating factor in human action, but give equal importance
to the complex array of moral, sentimental, aesthetic, religious, communal and other motivating factors that accompany our constant effort to
construct a meaningful life. In other words, individuals act not solely or
primarily for economic gain, but for “a complicated blend of material
and ‘existential’ considerations.”10
Importantly, and again unlike the standard law and economic account, this existential project necessarily involves not only competition,
but also collaboration and cooperation with others.
Our daily lives are typically grounded in the unshakable conviction
that no one’s life is more important than our own and that the world
is an inherently meaningful place. But one does not will this inner
view into existence of his or her own accord. It is instead a collaborative product, born of the everyday reciprocal meaning making,
identity conferring efforts we engage in with those around us. In
this we engage as existential “coconspirators,” relentlessly—if generally unconsciously—exchanging affirmations that sustain our
sense of our own significance and the world’s inherent meaningfulness.11

7. See William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law’s
Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 151 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
8. FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, supra note 1, at 34–50.
9. Id. at 43.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 42.
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Field theory fundamentally and sharply departs from the standard
law and economics view of economic and social life in the underlying
assumption as to the stage upon which human actors act. For Chicago
style theorists, individuals act autonomously as owners of human and
money capital via exchange either mediated through free markets or
within firms. Cooperation is contractual and actions are played out per a
script agreed on ex ante. The playing field is the market, with firms
viewed as mini-markets in which a subset of contractual exchanges take
place. Government’s role is simply to support and ensure a fair playing
field.
In contrast to this austere view, field theory sees social and economic life taking place in both unorganized social spaces and
well-organized strategic action fields.12 Strategic action fields may be
legally or informally bounded. Thus, a large corporation is a strategic
action field, but within it may be embedded numerous smaller strategic
action fields.13 In turn, each corporation is “embedded in a broader environment consisting of proximate or distal fields as well as states, which
are themselves organized as intricate systems of strategic action fields.”14
The boundaries and rules governing each strategic action field are constantly shifting and contested, with incumbents defending the status quo
and challengers seeking changes to their own advantage. New fields
emerge as human actors see opportunities not present in existing fields.
Thus, unlike the standard law and economic account, field theory allows
us to model and understand how change occurs in socially constructed
action spaces, including how change occurs within firms and industries,
and how new firms arise.15
Finally, field theory acknowledges the power differential between
human actors flowing from the unequal distribution of human and money
capital, but sees a dimension that the standard law and economic account
misses. Human actors pursue advantage by utilizing not just property
advantages, but through exercising social skills. The most effective human actors “possess a highly developed cognitive capacity for reading
people and environments, framing lines of action, and mobilizing people
in the service of broader conceptions of the world and themselves.”16 It is
this social skill that enables successful entrepreneurs to construct new
enterprises, drawing to them other human actors and resources that could
be deployed in safer ventures. It is this social skill that enables the suc12. Id. at 5.
13. Id. at 58.
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 83–113.
16. Id. at 17.
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cessful politician or CEO of a multinational corporation to shift the
boundaries and rules governing existing strategic action fields in which
they labor. Crucially, as Fligstein and McAdam emphasize, the successful actor never uses social skill in a narrow, self-interested manner, for
success is not about narrow self-interest.
[W]e see strategic action as inextricably linked to the distinctive
human capacity and need to fashion shared meanings and identities
to ensure a viable existential ground for existence. This is not to say
that power and preferences do not matter but that our attempts to
exercise the former and achieve the latter are always bound up with
larger issues of meaning and identity. What is more, our preferences
themselves are generally rooted in the central sources of meaning
and identi[t]y in our lives.17

A Theory of Fields nourished all of us who participated in Berle
VII, and it is my fervent wish that Berle VII will serve as beachhead for
field theory’s invasion of the turf now held by law and economic analysis. To that end, since the investment in buying and reading a book is not
inconsiderable, readers of this Symposium volume should pay special
attention to the generous and important contributions made by Fligstein
and McAdam. While readers of A Theory of Fields will find a fulsome
account of the existential function of the social, particularly in Chapter 2,
a revised and updated version of that account is now available in this issue; see Doug McAdam, On the Existential Function of the Social and
the Limits of Rationalist Accounts of Human Behavior.18 Additionally,
readers of A Theory of Fields will notice a paucity of examples illustrating how field theory actually relates to the fields of corporate law and
corporate governance. For a detailed “roadmap” richly illustrating those
connections, see Neil Fligstein, The Theory of Fields and its Application
to Corporate Governance.19
Berle VII contains a number of other truly remarkable contributions
giving special voice to corporate governance thought leaders in the social
sciences. We hope readers of this volume will savor these fresh and insightful perspective as, following in Berle’s footsteps, we continue to
encourage and nourish the very best interdisciplinary scholarship focusing on the nature of the modern corporation.

17. Id. at 18.
18. See infra pp. 225–36.
19. See infra pp. 237–62.

